Abstract-Secure distributed data storage can shift the burden of maintaining a large number of files from the owner to proxy servers. Proxy servers can convert encrypted files for the owner to encrypted files for the receiver without the necessity of knowing the content of the original files. In practice, the original files will be removed by the owner for the sake of space efficiency. Hence, the issues on confidentiality and integrity of the outsourced data must be addressed carefully. In this paper, we propose two identity-based secure distributed data storage (IBSDDS) schemes. Our schemes can capture the following properties: (1) The file owner can decide the access permission independently without the help of the private key generator (PKG); (2) For one query, a receiver can only access one file, instead of all files of the owner; (3) Our schemes are secure against the collusion attacks, namely even if the receiver can compromise the proxy servers, he cannot obtain the owner's secret key. Although the first scheme is only secure against the chosen plaintext attacks (CPA), the second scheme is secure against the chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA). To the best of our knowledge, it is the first IBSDDS schemes where an access permission is made by the owner for an exact file and collusion attacks can be protected in the standard model.
INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing provides users with a convenient mechanism to manage their personal files with the notion called database-as-a-service (DAS) [1] , [2] , [3] . In DAS schemes, a user can outsource his encrypted files to untrusted proxy servers. Proxy servers can perform some functions on the outsourced ciphertexts without knowing anything about the original files. Unfortunately, this technique has not been employed extensively. The main reason lies in that users are especially concerned on the confidentiality, integrity and query of the outsourced files as cloud computing is a lot more complicated than the local data storage systems, as the cloud is managed by an untrusted third party. After outsorcing the files to proxy servers, the user will remove them from his local machine. Therefore, how to guarantee the outsoured files are not accessed by the unauthorized users and not modified by proxy servers is an important problem that has been considered in the data storage research community. Furthermore, how to guarantee that an authorized user can query the outsourced files from proxy servers is another concern as the proxy server only maintains the outsourced ciphertexts. Consequently, research around these topics grows significantly.
Confidentiality is proposed to prevent unauthorized users from accessing the sensitive data as it is subject to unauthorized disclose and access after being outsourced. Since the introduction of DAS, the confidentiality of outsourced data has been the primary focus among the research community. To provide confidentiality to the outsourced data, encryption schemes are deployed [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] .
Integrity can prevent outsourced data from being replaced and modified. Some schemes have been proposed to protect the integrity of the outsourced data, such as proof of retrievability [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] and provable data possession [14] , [15] , [16] . In these schemes, digital signature schemes and message authentication codes (MACs) are deployed.
Query in data storage is executed between a receiver and a proxy server. The proxy server can perform some functions on the outsourced ciphertexts and convert them to those for the receiver. As a result, the receiver can obtain the data outsourced by the owner without the proxy server knowing the content of the data [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] .
Related Work
In this section, we review schemes related to identity-based secure distributed data storage (IBSDDS) schemes.
in the protection of the externally stored data. Kher and Kim [22] surveyed the data storage systems comprehensively and classified them into three kinds based on their security services: networked file systems (NFS), storagebased intrusion detection systems (SBIDS) and cryptographic file systems (CFS).
Networked file systems. In these systems, proxy servers are assumed to be trusted. They authenticate receivers and validate access permissions. The interactions between the proxy servers and receivers are executed in a secure channel. Therefore, these systems cannot provide an end-to-end data security, namely they cannot ensure the confidentiality of the data stored at the proxy server [23] , [24] , [25] . In these schemes, a receiver authenticates himself to the proxy server using his password. Then, the proxy server passes the authentication result to the file owner. The owner will make an access permission according to the received information.
Storage-based Intrusion Detection Systems. In these systems, an intrusion detection scheme is embedded in proxy servers or the file owner to detect the intruder's behaviors, such as adding backdoors, inserting Trojan horses and tampering with audit logs. These schemes can be classified into two types: host-based system and network-based system. In the host-based systems, an intrusion detection scheme is embedded in the host to detect the local intrusion actions [26] . On the contrary, in network-based systems, an intrusion detection scheme is embedded in the proxy servers to detect the external intruder's actions. The main advantage of these systems is that proxy servers can still detect the intrusion actions even if the host is compromised as the proxy server are independent from the host [27] , [28] , [29] .
Cryptographic file system. In these systems, an end-toend security is provided by cryptographic protocols which are executed by the file owner to prevent proxy servers and unauthorized users from modifying and accessing the sensitive files. These systems can be divided into two types: shared file system and non-shared system. In shared file systems [30] , [31] , the owner can share his files with a group of users. Cryptographic techniques deployed in these systems are key sharing, key agreement and key revocation. In non-shared file systems [32] , [33] , in order to share a file with another user, the owner can compute an access key for the user using his secret key. In these two systems, the integrity of the sensitive files is provided by digital signature schemes and message authentication codes.
Identity-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (IBPRE)
Proxy cryptosystem was introduced by Mambo and Okamoto [34] to delegate the decryption power to a designated decryptor. Then, Blaze et al. [35] proposed an atomic proxy cryptosystem where a semi-trusted proxy server can transfer a ciphertext for the original decryptor to a ciphertext for the designated decryptor without knowing the plaintext. Proxy cryptosystem as an efficient primitive has been used in email forwarding, law enforcement and data storage. Identity-based cryptosystem introduced by Shamir [36] is a system where the public key can be any arbitrary string and the secret key is issued by a trusted party called the private key generator (PKG). Being different from public key infrastructure (PKI), two parties can communicate directly without verifying their public key certificates in identitybased systems. The first secure and practical identity-base encryption (IBE) was proposed by Boneh and Franklin [37] based on pairing.
Identity-based proxy encryption (IBPE) was first proposed by Ivan and Dodis [4] where the formal definitions and security models for both unidirectional and bidirectional IBPE schemes were formalized. In their schemes, the master secret key which is used to extract secret keys for users is split into two parts. One is sent to the proxy server and the other is sent to the user. The user can decrypt a ciphertext for him with the help of the proxy server. Consequently, Ateniese et al. [5] pointed out that these schemes are not secure against the collusion attacks, namely the master secret key can be exposed if the user can compromise the proxy server. The first identity-based proxy re-encryption was proposed by Green and Ateniese [38] where the proxy server can transfer a ciphertext for the original decryptor to a ciphertext for the designated decryptor after he gets a reencryption key from the former. We divide the IBPRE schemes into the following two types based on the generation of the re-encryption key:
The re-encryption key can be computed by the original decryptor [38] , [39] , [40] . In these schemes, for a decryption request, the original decryptor selects a random number and computes a re-encryption key by randomizing his secret key. Then, he encrypts the selected random number under the receiver's identity. Finally, he sends the reencryption key and the ciphertext to the proxy server. Using the re-encryption key, the proxy server can transfer a ciphertext for the original decryptor to a ciphertext for the designated decryptor. The designated decryptor decrypts the ciphertext using his secret key and obtains the random number selected by the original decrptor. Then, he can decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext by the random number. Unfortunately, these schemes are vulnerable to the collusion attacks. If the designated decryptor can compromise the proxy server, they can decrypt the ciphertext, obtain the random number selected by the original decryptor and compute the secret key of the original decryptor.
The re-encryption key must be computed by the PKG [41] , [42] , [43] . In these schemes, the PKG computes the reencryption key by checking the secret keys of the original decryptor and the designated decryptor.
Identity-Based Secure Distributed Data Storage
In an identity-based secure distributed data storage scheme, a user's identity can be an arbitrary string and two parties can communicate with each other without checking the public key certificates. At first, the file owner encrypts his files under his identity prior to outsourcing them to proxy servers. Then, he sends the ciphertexts to the proxy servers. Consequently, the proxy servers can transfer a ciphertext encrypted under the identity of the owner to a ciphertext encrypted under the identity of the receiver after they has obtained an access permission (re-encryption key) from the owner.
To provide confidentiality for the outsouced data, an efficient IBSDDS scheme should provide the following properties: [5] . Proxy invisibility discussed in [5] is difficult to achieve as the length of the re-encrypted ciphertext is subject to be different from that of the original ciphertext. Furthermore, original-access mentioned in [5] cannot be guaranteed as the key escrow problem, namely the secret key is created by the PKG, instead of the user. Hence, the file owner in an IBSDSS scheme has less control on his secret key than that in other public key encryption schemes.
Although IBPRE holds partial properties of IBSDDS, it cannot been used in IBSDDS systems directly. For example, in the current IBPRE schemes, the receiver and the proxy servers can cooperate to access all the files outsourced by the owner as the access permission (re-encryption key) is only bound to the identity of the receiver and independent of the file. This is undesirable for the file owner to record the accessed number of his files. Furthermore, they are interactive [41] , [42] , [43] or not collusion safe [38] , [39] , [40] .
Since the PKG can generate a secret key for each user, he can decrypt the ciphertexts and obtain the original files if he knows the identity used to encrypt the files. Therefore, in this paper, we assume that the PKG is honest and can be trusted by all users in the systems.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose two identity-based secure distributed data storage schemes in standard model where, for one query, the receiver can only access one of the owner's files, instead of all files. In other words, an access permission (re-encryption key) is bound not only to the identity of the receiver but also the file. The access permission can be decided by the owner, instead of the trusted party (PKG). Furthermore, our schemes are secure against the collusion attacks. Although the first scheme is CPA secure, the second scheme achieves chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) security. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first IBSDDS schemes where an access permission is made by the owner for an exact file and collusion attacks can be protected in the standard model.
To achieve a stronger security and implement filebased access control, the owner must be online to authenticate requesters and also to generate access permissions for them. Therefore, the owner in our schemes needs do more computations than that in PRE schemes. Although PRE schemes can provide the similar functionalities of our schemes when the owner only has one file, these are not flexible and practical.
Paper Organization
We review the preliminaries used throughout the paper in Section 2. In Section 3, we propose a CPA secure IBSDDS scheme and analyze its security. A CCA secure IBSDDS scheme is proposed and proven in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
PRELIMINARIES
In the remainder of this paper, we denote a R A as a is chosen from A at random. Especially, we denote a R A as a is chosen uniformly from A if A is a finite set. For n 2 IN, we denote ½n as the integers f1; 2; . . . ; ng. By AðxÞ ! y, we denote that y is computed by running the algorithm A on input x. We say that a function : Z Z ! IR is negligible if, for all k 2 Z Z, there exists a z 2 Z Z such that ðxÞ 1 x k when x > z.
Identity-Based Secure Distributed Data Storage
There are four entities in an identity-based secure distributed data storage scheme: the private key generator, the data owner, the proxy server and the receiver. The PKG validates the users' identities and issues secret keys to them. The data owner encrypts his data and outsources the ciphertexts to the proxy servers. Proxy servers store the encrypted data and transfer the ciphertext for the owner to the ciphertext for the receiver when they obtains an access permission (re-encryption key) from the owner. The receiver authenticates himself to the owner and decrypts the re-encrypted ciphertext to obtain the data. An IBSDDS scheme consists of the following algorithms: Setupð1 ' Þ ! ðparams; MSKÞ: The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 ' , and outputs the public parameters params and a master secret MSK.
KeyGenðparams; ID; MSKÞ ! SK ID : The key generation algorithm takes as input the public parameters params, an identity ID and the master secret key MSK, and outputs a secret key SK ID for the identity ID.
Encryptionðparams; ID; M i Þ ! CT i : Suppose that there are k messages fM 1 ; M 2 ; . . . ; M k g. To encrypt the message M i , the encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters params, the identity ID and the message M i , and outputs the ciphertext CT i ¼ ðC i;1 ; C i;2 Þ, for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; k. It sends the ciphertexts CT i to the proxy servers. QueryðID 0 ; SK ID 0 ; CT i Þ ! AI: The query algorithm takes as input the receiver's identity ID 0 , the receiver's secrete key SK ID 0 and the ciphertext CT i , and outputs an authentication information AI. It sends ðID 0 ; AI; CT i Þ to the proxy server. The proxy server redirects ðID 0 ; AI; C i;2 Þ to the owner with identity ID.
Permission ðparams; ID 0 ; C i;2 ; SK ID Þ ! RK ID!ID 0 . The permission algorithm checks the authentication information AI. If the receiver is legal, this algorithm takes as inputs the public parameters params, the receiver's identity ID 0 and the owner's secret key SK ID , and outputs an access permission (re-encryption key) RK ID!ID 0 . It sends RK ID!ID 0 to the proxy server.
Re 
The receiver decryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters params, the receiver's secret key SK ID 0 and the re-encrypted ciphertext CT 0 i , and outputs the message M i .
Definition 1.
We say an identity-based secure distributed data storage scheme is correct if where the probability is taken over the random coins which all the algorithms in the scheme consumes.
Security Model
We formalize the security model of the IBSDDS scheme by the following game. This game is run between a challenger and an adversary as follows: Setup. The challenger runs Setupð1 ' Þ to generate the public parameters params and a master secret key MSK, and sends params to the adversary A. Phase 1. The adversary A can adaptively make the following queries: Definition 2. An identity-based secure distributed data storage scheme is ðT ; q 1 ; q 2 ; q 3 ; q 4 ; q 5 ; ð'ÞÞ-secure against chosen ciphertext attacks if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A making at most q 1 secret key queries, q 2 permission queries, q 3 re-encryption queries, q 4 owner decryption queries and q 5 receiver decryption queries can win the game with the advantage 
Complexity Assumption
Let G G and G G t be two multiple cyclic groups with prime order p, and g be a generator of G G. A bilinear map e : G G Â G G ! G G t is a map satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinearity. For all u; v 2 G G and x; y 2 Z Z p , eðu x ; v y Þ ¼ eðu; vÞ xy . 2. No-degeneracy. eðg; gÞ 6 ¼ 1 where 1 is the identity of the group G G t . 3. Computability. There exists an efficient algorithm which can compute eðu; vÞ for all u; v 2 G G.
We denote GGð1 ' Þ as a bilinear group generator which takes as input a security parameter 1 ' and outputs a bilinear group ðe; p; G G; G G t Þ with prime order p.
Definition 4 (Decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH)
assumption [37] where the probability is token over the random choices of a; b; c; z and the bits consumed by A.
Waters's Identity-Based Encryption (IBE)
This identity-based encryption [44] works as follows:
Setup. This algorithm takes as input the security parameters 1 ' , and outputs a bilinear group GGð1 ' Þ ! ðe; p; G G; G G t Þ with prime order p, where e : G G Â G G ! G G t . Let g and h be generators of the group G G, u 0 R G G and U ¼ ðu 1 ; u 2 ; . . . ; u n Þ where u i R G G for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n. It sets g 1 ¼ g a where a R Z Z p . The public parameters are ðe; p; G G; G G t ; g; h; u 0 ; g 1 ; UÞ and the master secret key is h a . KeyGen. Let ID represent an identity which is an n bit string, ID i be the ith bit of ID, and I be the set which consists of all i with ID i ¼ 1. This algorithm chooses r R Z Z p , and computes
The secret key for the identity ID is SK ID ¼ ðK ID;1 ; K ID;2 Þ. Encryption. To encrypt a message M 2 G G t , this algorithm chooses s R Z Z p and computes
The ciphertext for the message M is CT ¼ ðC 1 ; C 2 ; C 3 Þ. Decryption. To decrypt the ciphertext CT ¼ ðC 1 ; C 2 ; C 3 Þ, this algorithm takes as input the secret key SK ID ¼ ðK ID;1 ; K ID;2 Þ and computes 
IDENTITY-BASED SECURE DISTRIBUTED DATA STORAGE I (IBSDDS I)
In this section, we propose an identity-based secure distributed data storage scheme which is secure against chosen plaintext attacks. At first, the file owner encrypts his files and outsources the ciphertexts to the proxy servers. The proxy servers validate the outsourced ciphertexts and store them for the owner. For one query, the receiver computes an authentication information (AI) using his secret key and sends it to the proxy server. The proxy server sends the identity of the receiver, AI and the partial intended ciphertext to the owner. Suppose that the owner can know which file the receiver wants to access from the partial ciphertext. To check whether the requester is a legal user in the system, the owner validates the received AI. If the AI is correct, the owner computes an access permission (re-encryption key) using his secret key, the partial ciphertext and the identity of the receiver, and sends it to the proxy server. Otherwise, the access is denied. The proxy server transfers the intended ciphertext to a ciphertext for the receiver using the received access permission. Finally, the receiver can decrypt the reencrypted ciphertext by his secret key and obtains the original file. Fig. 1 explains the model of our IBSDDS schemes. The specific protocol of our IBSDDS I scheme is demonstrated in Fig. 2 . Our scheme can be seen as an extension of Water's IBE [44] .
Correctness.
We have
Theorem 3. Our identity-based secure distributed data storage I scheme is ðT ; q 1 ; q 2 ; q 3 ; ð'ÞÞ-secure against chose plaintext attacks (CPA) if the ðT 0 ; 0 ð'ÞÞ-decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in the bilinear group ðe; p; G G; G G t Þ where
Proof. Our proof is similar to that in Waters's IBE [44] , except that we must answer the permission queries and re-encryption queries. Suppose that there exists an adversary A that can ðT ; q 1 ; q 2 ; q 3 ; ð'ÞÞ break the CPA security of our IBSDDS I scheme, we can construct an algorithm B that can use A to break the DBDH assumption as follows. The challenger generates the bilinear group GGð1 ' Þ ! ðe; p; where p i R ½s À 1 and f i R Z Z p for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n. It choose p 0 R ½s À 1 and f 0 R Z Z p . Then, the algorithm B defines three functions:
and
The public parameters are ðe; p; G G; G G t ; g; h; h; g; h; u 0 ; g 1 ; 
Phase 1.
1. Secret key query. The adversary A can query secret key for an identity ID. B checks RðIDÞ ¼ ? 1.
a. If RðIDÞ ¼ 1, B chooses r R Z Z p and computes
B responds with SK ID ¼ ðK ID;1 ; K ID;2 ; K ID;3 Þ. b. If RðIDÞ ¼ 0, B aborts and outputs his guess m 0 randomly. We claim that the secret key is generated correctly: 
:
Letr ¼ r À a P ðIDÞ , we have
Therefore, the secret key is created correctly. Permission query. The adversary A can query permission on ðID; ID 0 ; C 2 Þ. B checks whether he has generated secret keys for identities ID and ID 0 . If he has not generated secret keys for ID and ID 0 , B checks whether RðIDÞ ¼ 1 and RðIDÞ 0 ¼ 1. 
B sends ðD 1 ; D 2 ; D 3 ; K ID;2 Þ to the adversary A. b. Otherwise, B aborts the simulation and outputs his guess m 0 randomly. Re-encryption query. The adversary can query reencryption on ðID; ID 0 ; CÞ. B check whether he has generated an access permission ðD 1 ; D 2 ; D 3 ; K ID;2 Þ from identities ID to identity ID 0 . If he has not generated an access permission from ID to ID 0 , he generated ðD 1 ; D 2 ; D 3 ; K ID;2 Þ as above. Otherwise, B can compute . t u
We demonstrate the computation cost and communication cost of our IBSDDS I scheme in Tables 1 and 2 , where by E and P , we denote the running time of executing one exponential and one paring, respectively. By E G G and E G G t , we denote the length of one element in the group G G and G G t , respectively. By P KG, U, P S, O and R, we denote the private key generator, the user, the proxy server, the data owner and the receiver, respectively. We compare the properties of the related schemes in Table 3 .
IDENTITY-BASED SECURE DISTRIBUTED DATA STORAGE II (IBSDDS II)
In some complex network environments, such as cloud computing and distributed systems, CPA security cannot satisfy the application requirement. Therefore, identity-based distributed data storage scheme with strong security (CCA) is desirable. In this section, we propose a CCA-2 secure identity-based secure distributed storage II scheme by introducing an existentially unforgeable one-time signature scheme to the IBSDDS I scheme. This idea is from [45] . Our IBSDDS II scheme is demonstrated in Fig. 3 .
Correctness. This is the same as in the scheme IBSDDS I.
Theorem 4. Our identity-based secure distributed data storage scheme II scheme is ðT ; q 1 ; q 2 ; q 3 ; q 4 ; q 5 ; ð'ÞÞ-secure against chose ciphertext attacks if the one-time signature scheme is ðT 0 ; 1; 0 ð'ÞÞ-existentially unforgeable and the ðT 00 ; 00 ð'ÞÞ decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in the bilinear group ðe; p; G G; G G t Þ where
Proof. Suppose that there exists an adversary A that can break the CCA security of our IBSDDS II scheme with advantage
00 ð'Þ, we can construct an algorithm B that can use A to forge a signature or break the DBDH assumption as follows. The challenger generates the bilinear group 
Then, the algorithm B defines three functions:
It chooses h R G G and an one-time signature scheme SGð1 ' Þ ! ðSKeyGen; Sign; VerifyÞ. The public parameters are ðe; p; G G; G G t ; g; h; h; g; h; u 0 ; g 1 ; g 2 ; U U; Sign; VerifyÞ and the master secret key is h a ¼ g ab . The distribution of these parameters is identical to those in the real protocol. Phase 1. As shown above, the public parameters and the secret keys created in the simulation paradigm are identical to those created in the real protocol. The algorithm B does not abort the simulation if and only if the secret keys can be generated correctly, RðID Ã Þ ¼ 0 and the signatures in the ciphertext are valid. In q 1 secret key queries, q 2 permission queries, q 3 re-encryption queries, q 4 owner decryption queries and q 5 receiver decryption queries, B needs to create at most q 1 þ 2q 2 þ 2q 3 þ q 4 þ 2q 5 secret keys. Now, we bound the probability with which B can break the DBDH assumption. This bound is computed using the method in [46] . where Pr½abort is the probability with which B aborts the simulation. The first inequality is from the case Z ¼ eðg; gÞ abc , so the simulation is performed correctly if B does not abort. Hence, B can solve the DBDH assumption with the advantage at least ð'Þ 32ðq 1 þ 2q 2 þ 2q 3 þ q 4 þ 2q 5 Þðn þ 1Þ ! 00 ð'Þ:
It remains to bound the probability with which B aborts the simulation as a result of A's decryption queries. We claim that Pr½abort < 0 ð'Þ. Otherwise, a forged signature can be computed with advantage at least 0 ð'Þ. Briefly, receiving the challenged signature key sk Ã in the simulation, A causes an abort by submitting a decryption query which includes a forged signature of one ciphertext under sk Ã . Therefore, B can use the forged signature to break the existential unforgability of the one-time signature. Notably, A can only query one signature for the challenged ciphertext. Hence, we have Pr½abort < 0 ð'Þ. So, B can break the decisional bilinear DiffieHellman assumption with advantage more than ð'Þ 32ðq 1 þ2q 2 þ2q 3 þq 4 þ2q 5 Þðnþ1Þ . This finishes our proof.
t u
CONCLUSION
Distributed data storage schemes provide the users with convenience to outsource their files to untrusted proxy servers. Identity-based secure distributed data storage schemes are a special kind of distributed data storage schemes where users are identified by their identities and can communicate without the need of verifying the public key certificates. In this paper, we proposed two new IBSDDS schemes in standard model where, for one query, the receiver can only access one file, instead of all files. Furthermore, the access permission can be made by the owner, instead of the trusted party. Notably, our schemes are secure against the collusion attacks. The first scheme is CPA secure, while the second one is CCA secure.
